classical messages without establishing any shared keys previously. In this paper, a quantum secure direct communication scheme using quantum Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) error correction codes is proposed. In the scheme, a secure message is first transformed into a binary error vector and then encrypted (decrypted) via quantum coding (decoding) procedures. An adversary Eve, who has controlled the communication channel, can't recover the secrete messages because she doesn't know the deciphering keys. Security of this scheme is based on the assumption that decoding general linear codes is intractable even on quantum computers.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution provides a novel way to obtain ultimate security based on quantum mechanics, which cares about agreeing classical keys between two communication entities over quantum channel [1] . Different from quantum key distribution, quantum secure direct communication permits important messages to be communicated directly without establishing a random shared key to encrypt them. QSDC can be used in some special environments, with an example where it is difficult to establish a session key between two communication parties.
As a secure QSDC scheme, it requires that the secure messages encoded in the quantum states should not leak to an eavesdropper Eve even if she has controlled the communication channel. A "good" QSDC scheme also expects that no additional classical messages are needed to exchange between communication entities except the encoded quantum messages.
Several QSDC protocols have been addressed recently. In 2002, Beige et al. proposed a QSDC scheme based on sigle-photon two qubit states [2] . In their scheme, the secure message can be read only after a transmission of an additional classical message for each qubit. Boström and Felbingeer addressed a Ping-Pang QSDC protocol [3] using
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs as quantum information carriers, in which the secure messages can be decoded during the transmission and no final transmission of additional information is needed. However, Wòjcik proved that, in this scheme, Eve can get a part of the secure message with some probability, especially in a noisy quantum channel [4] . Recently, Deng et al. put forward a quantum one-time-pad based QSDC scheme [5] , in which batches of single photons were used to serve as a one-time-pad to encode the secret messages. However, all the existed QSDC schemes need to publicize some additional classical messages to check out whether there exist eavesdroppers over the quantum communication channel.
In this paper, we propose a new QSDC scheme using quantum CSS codes, after the initials of the inventors of this class of codes. In the proposed scheme, we suppose that the channel between communication entities is noiseless. In this scheme, the receiver Bob sends some quantum states encoded using quantum CSS codes. Alice transforms the secure messages into some error vectors and applies these errors on the qubits and sends them to Bob. Bob receives the messages and recovers the secure messages. Security of this scheme is based on the fact that decoding an arbitrary linear code is NP-hard and Goppa codes have efficient decoding algorithm.
Preliminaries
2.1 Quantum CSS codes [6−9] The constructions of quantum CSS codes rely heavily on the properties of classical error-correcting codes.
Here, we first review the basic definitions of binary classical linear codes. Let's consider vectors and codes over the field F 2 including two elements, one and zero. Quantum CSS codes can be constructed by using classical linear codes. Theorem 1 [6] . Suppose that there exist two classical binary linear codes :
. A set of its basis states can be expressed as
Let G i ,H i be the generator matrix and parity check matrix of C i respectively, (i=1,2). Without loss of generality,
can be encoded into a quantum codeword
where D (j) is the j′th row of D, 1≤j≤k.
Quantum errors will occur when quantum states are transmitted over quantum channels. There are three basic errors on a qubit: bit error, phase error and their composition, which can be described by Pauli matrices respectively:
For any a∈{x,y,z}, r=(r 1 ,…,r n )∈ , let , where 
Goppa codes
Goppa codes are an important class of linear codes, some of which can meet the Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
Goppa codes have been widely used to construct public-key encryption systems and message authentication codes since they have a fast decoding algorithm and a large number of nonequivalent classes [10] . Here we only consider binary Goppa Codes. From the above definitions, it's easy to know that Goppa code Γ(L,g(z)) is uniquely determined by g(z) and L. It can also be proved that Γ(L,g(z)) has parameters [n,k>n−mt,d≥t+1] [11] . By some computing results over finite fields we know that Goppa codes have a large number of nonequivalent classes, which makes it possible to construct cryptosystems by using Goppa codes.
The Proposed Quantum Secure Direct Communication Scheme
This section describes a QSDC scheme using quantum CSS codes introduced in Section 2. In the scheme, Alice transforms a secure message p into a binary error vector and then encrypts it via quantum coding procedures. Bob can recover the message because he has the fast decoding algorithm of the error correction codes. The scheme is specified as follows. k k k n = + − . We assume that the quantum channel used in this scheme is noiseless channel.
Step 1. Encoding
Bob randomly chooses a generator matrix G i and parity check matrix
here the rank of D is k k .He then randomly prepares a basis state |m〉 such that m∈ and encodes it into |c〉 using quantum CSS codes Q according to equation (3) . Bob acts some error e′=(X′|Z′) on |c〉 as 
) and the bits string e′, m as his private keys and sends |ψ〉 to Alice over public quantum channel.
Step 2. Encryption
Suppose that Alice has a privacy message p in hand and wants to transmit it to Bob securely. She firstly applies an algorithm (Algorithm 1) to transform p into a binary error vector
. Alice receives Bob's qubits |ψ〉 and applies error e ′ ′ on them as
Alice sends |ψ′〉 back to Bob.
For quantum CCS codes, there are error vectors whose Hamming weight is . Borrowing the idea from Ref. [12] , we can construct one-to-one correspondence between this set of quantum error vectors
and integer p if they satisfy 0≤p< 3 .
Then, an algorithm can be devised to transform any integer p described above into a quantum error vector e'' using the order-preserving mapping induced by the lexicographic order of the vectors and the natural order of the integers. 
Security against eavesdropping
In this subsection, we consider an adversary Eve who has controlled the quantum channel linking Alice and Bob and tries to recover the plaintext p that Alice has sent to Bob. Supposing Eve knows the parity check matrix H 1 and H 2 , she can obtain the error vectors if she can compute X and Z from Eqs. (13), (14) . We know that resolving Eqs. (13), (14) equals to the problem of decoding general linear codes, which is an NP-C problem [10] . Though quantum algorithms are shown exponentially faster than classical ones when coping with some problems, such as integer factor and discrete logarithm problem [13] , it is widely believed that NP-C problems are still intractable by quantum (probabilistic) polynomial-time Turing machines [14] . We know that the Goppa codes used in the proposed scheme are uniquely decided by polynomials g(Z) and ordered sets L. Therefore, if Eve wants to get the fast decoding algorithm of Goppa codes C 1 ,C 2 , she must find g(z) and L. However the computational complexity of quantum Grover search algorithm to obtain g(z) and L by the key C 2 ,H 1 is O((2 mt n!) 1/2 ), and it is still infeasible to break this cryptosystem by quantum searching algorithm in polynomial time. In fact, Eve doesn't know the matrix H 1 ,H 2 and G 2 because the generation matrices G 1 ,G 2 and the parity check matrices H 1 ,H 2 , are Bob's private keys.
Therefore, the difficulties of Eve's recovering of the secret messages are at least as decoding the general linear codes.
The essential difference between this scheme with the EPR protocol, Ping-Pong protocol and one-time-pad based protocol is that it doesn't need to establish a quantum entangled channel and doesn't need to exchange (or broadcast) any additional classical messages to detect the existence of eavesdropper. In the proposed scheme, eavesdropping can be detected just by comparing some recovered bits m′ and Bob's original bits m.
:
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Conclusions
Error correcting codes have been widely used to construct cryptosystems in modern cryptography. In this paper, a QSDC scheme is proposed using quantum CSS codes. In the proposed scheme, Alice can securely transmit some classical messages to Bob over an authenticated quantum channel without establishing any pre-shared keys and transforming any additional classical information. In this scheme, Alice firstly maps her secure messages to some error vector and applies this error on the encoded states that Bob sent to her. Eve cannot recover the plaintext because she knows nothing about Bob's secrete keys. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the fact that decoding general linear codes is NP-C problem and Goppa codes have efficient decoding algorithm.
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